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During the last few decades, mainstream parties have faced a strong electoral decline. Mainstream parties 
responded on this change in electoral outcome with party change. In this paper, two categories of responses 
were studied in a dichotomic framework of mainstream- and niche party competition. First, organizational 
changes were examined as changes in the organizations’ decision-making structure. This was measured 
through a document analysis of the mainstream parties’ statutory rules. Second, programmatic changes were 
examined as a change in policy position and salience of the niche parties’ main issue in the mainstream 
parties’ manifestos. Data of the Comparative Manifesto Project were used. I examined the responses of the 
three Flemish mainstream parties (SP,CVP and PVV/VLD) during the 1990s. All three mainstream parties 
responded on the change in electoral outcome with both programmatic and organizational change. However, 
programmatic change was implemented more than organizational change. Furthermore, there was variation 
in the direction of change between the three mainstream parties. This research has important implications for 
the analysis of multiparty competition and the party change literature 
 
 






Mainstream parties in Western Europe are facing significant electoral losses (figure 1). Since 1950, the 
combined average vote share of 12 West-European mainstream parties declined with 23,5 percent points. 
Despite this declining trend, the extent of the descent differs each decade. It slowly started in the 1960s, with 
1,6 percent points. In the 1990s, it reached a strong decline with 7 percent points. In the most recent decade, 
this descent is the strongest present with 9 percent points and the mainstream parties are at their lowest level 
in history with 58% of the vote share. In the 1950s, they still reached 83,5% (Luypaert, 2019). Whereas 
mainstream parties were long electoral dominant players, they are now facing strong competition of niche 
parties. In this paper, mainstream parties are parties that focus merely on socio-economic issues, compete to 
one another in historical existing lines of political division and treat a broad range of issues. 
 
 

































The factors causing this decline have been widely studied before. There has first been a change in party 
competition, where policy issues replace long-established societal cleavages (Hobolt & de Vries, 2015). 
Second, there has been a changing party system since the 1960s. Parties have transitioned towards a catch-
all party and centripetal electoral competition occurred (Panebianco, 1988). Competition between parties is 
less about ideological differences, but through perception, imago and charisma of political leaders (Krouwel, 
2003). Additionally, or maybe because of these changes, electoral volatility has increased (Harmel & Janda, 
1994). Remarkably, the integrated study of mainstream parties’ responses to this declining trend is 
insufficiently studied before. This is perhaps due to the recent drastic changes in electoral outcomes. 20 years 
ago, both Mair (1999) and Meguid (2002) have stated that the decline of mainstream parties was under control 
and predicted that mainstream parties would remain dominant. However, this decline in electoral vote share 
was never as strong as before. Furthermore, mainstream parties do not remain dominant in this decade. Both 
in Belgium, Germany as the Netherlands, radical right parties are in the top three of parties that obtained 
most of the electoral vote share in the recent elections. In Flanders, the first two positions are occupied by 
two niche parties: N-VA and Vlaams Belang. Electoral circumstances affect society since politics and its 
environment are continuously in interaction with each other (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). Growing electoral 
instability can be expected to cause growing instability for society as the formation and maintenance of stable 
coalitions become more difficult. As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to find consensus regarding 
policy problems (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). Therefore it is crucial to examine to what degree parties counter 
this growing instability (Panebianco, 1988). Both Panebianco (1988) and Janda (1990) have argued that 
parties will implement changes when they face strong electoral loss. However, I am aware that electoral 
losses is not a sufficient explanation for party change. A change of dominant faction, a leadership change or 
differing party goals may be other explanations for party change (Harmel & Janda, 1994). This paper focus 
nevertheless on party reforms as mainstream party responses to their electoral losses. I will focus on two 
types of responses given by mainstream parties: programmatic and organizational change. Both responses 
are examined in comparison with the organizational and programmatic positions of the niche parties during 
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the 1990s in Flanders. This paper aims to answer the following four research questions: RQ1: Which 
programmatic responses did the Flemish mainstream parties implement? RQ2: Which organizational 
responses did the Flemish mainstream parties implement? RQ3: Which of these two responses were 
implemented the most? RQ4: When were the most responses implemented by each mainstream party?  
 
Flanders is an interesting case as the mainstream parties faced one of the strongest declines in Western 
Europe. During the 1950s, the combined average (92,5%) of all Belgian mainstream parties was the third 
highest out of twelve European countries. During the most recent decade they have the third lowest combined 
average (52,9%). The 1990s is the second decade where mainstream parties faced the strongest electoral loss 
(8 percent points compared to 1980s) (Luypaert, 2019). Furthermore, in this period a “frantic search for 
change and renewal can be witnessed” (Deschouwer, 2004, p179). The organizational and programmatic 
responses of the Flemish mainstream parties are examined through a document analysis of the parties 
statutory regulations and party manifesto coding (CMP). The findings are that all three mainstream parties 
implemented both programmatic as well as organizational reforms. Programmatic changes were implemented 
more than organizational changes by all three parties. Nevertheless, there was variation between the 
mainstream parties in the amount of responses and direction of the responses. PVV implemented the most 
changes, followed by CVP. SP implemented the least changes.  
 
In following section mainstream and niche parties will be conceptualized. Second, I will argue why 
mainstream parties would implement changes after electoral loss based on the theoretical models of Mair et 
al. (2004), Harmel & Janda, (1994), Janda (1990) and Panebianco (1988). Third, programmatic and 
organizational responses will be discussed in more detail. The paper ends with a discussion of the most 





Decline of mainstream parties and responses 
Conceptualization of mainstream parties 
In the broadest sense, this paper examines party competition in the dichotomic view of niche and mainstream 
parties. Many scholars defined these two different types of parties, focusing more on the niche party concept. 
As a result, a negative definition will be used to define mainstream parties. Adams et al (2006) made a 
distinction based on party families. Niche parties are defined as all parties being member of communist, green 
and extreme nationalist parties. Wagner (2012) developed a framework where the number of issues handled 
by the parties determine whether they are a mainstream or a niche party. Niche parties will handle a small set 
of non-economic issues, while mainstream parties will do the opposite. In a more recent article, Meyer and 
Miller (2015) saw niche parties as an ideal type where the nicheness may fluctuate over time. According to 
these authors, different parties can have a different grade of nicheness, whereas a niche party is the party 
where the nicheness is strongest present. The objective of this paper is to examine mainstream parties’ 
responses in a period of their electoral losses and niche parties’ success. The definition of Meguid (2005) is 
the most comprehensive one as it emphasizes multiple areas. Furthermore, Meguid involves the perception 
of the voters. This is important as I examine the responses after electoral loss, thus after a changing political 
choice of voters. According to Meguid (2005), niche parties differ from mainstream parties on three areas. 
First, niche parties reject traditional class-based orientation of politics. Their approaching issues are beyond 
economic demands. Second, the issues of niche parties do not often coincide with existing lines of political 
division. Third, niche parties treat only a restricted set of issues. While this quantity increases in party 
manifestos, the perception of the voters as single issue parties still exists. They do not rely on existing broad 
ideological positions. Based on this negative definition of Meguid (2005), mainstream parties are parties that 
focus merely on socio-economic issues, compete to one another in historical existing lines of political 
division and treat a broad range of issues. Adapting this definition on the Flemish context between 1987-
1999 three mainstream parties can be distinguished: the social democratic sp, the Christian democratic CVP, 
the liberal PVV/VLD and three niche parties: AGALEV, Volksunie and Vlaams Blok. The responses of 
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mainstream parties will be examined when the niche parties are successful. However, Volksunie will not be 
included in our analysis as their main political issues were decentralization and granting the regions more 
autonomy. These issues were already adapted by the mainstream parties as the federalization reforms had 
already been started in 1970 (Hooghe, 1993). This analysis focusses on the differences in responses between 
the three mainstream parties towards the success of niche parties. The characteristics of niche parties are 
discussed as a point of direction regarding the differences between mainstream parties.  
 
Party competition and party responses 
This paper focusses on party competition and the consequences for individual mainstream parties in the above 
mentioned dichotomic framework1. Party competition is “an institution in which parties strategically 
cooperate or contest as political actors to gain political power” Franzmann (2011, p320). It is affected by 
changes in electoral markets. Three examples are structural dealignment, the increased attention of post 
material issues and the prominence of issue competition (Mair et al., 2004). These changes influence electoral 
outcome, or electoral change. We argue that this electoral change influences party reform, conform the 
“performance theory of party change” (Janda, 1990). This theory of party change states that “parties are more 
likely to change their tactics, structures, issue orientations, organizational identity, and goals under conditions 
of adversity than under electoral success or equilibrium” (Janda, 1990, p17). As mentioned in the 
introduction, one remarkable electoral change is this decline of mainstream parties. In this paper, party 
reforms will be studied as mainstream party responses to their electoral losses. Figure 2 is a schematic model 
of this theoretical outline. It is supplemented with the theory of the three phases of party change of Panebianco 
(1980). The first phase of Panebianco’s cycle is an environmental shock where already existed preconditions 
for change are catalyzed. The second phase is discrediting the old coalition which was unable to handle the 
crisis. It will led to a change of dominant faction. We do not discuss this in detail, because it is often seen as 
 
1 There are next to this dichotomic model other useful classifications for party competition. One example is the Downsian spatial theory (Downs, 1957). But 
given the recent gap between the vote share of mainstream parties and the vote share of niche parties, the dichotomy between the two types of parties is preferable. 
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an indirect source and ‘a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for party change’ (Harmel et al., 1995, 
p5). Third, restructuring within the party occurs. This third phase will be discussed most. It can be separated 
in two categories. First, the rules of internal competition are changed. One example is a revised party leader 
election. Second, the party goals are redefined. This can be strategic, as well as programmatic (Panebianco, 
1988). As mentioned before, we focus also on this programmatic dimension of mainstream parties. In 
following sections, we will discuss changes in electoral outcome, party responses, programmatic and 
organizational change in more detailed.  
 
Figure 2 Schematic overview party change after electoral loss, based on Mair et al (2004), Janda (1990) & Panebianco (1988). 
 
a. Changes in electoral outcomes 
Previous mentioned changes in electoral markets affects electoral outcome. As discussed in the introduction, 
mainstream parties have faced strong electoral losses in the 1990s. This electoral defeat is often seen as “the 
mother of party change” (Janda, 1990). Parties need often an environmental shock for party change to happen 
since they are by nature conservative (Panebianco, 1988). Political parties are seen as conservative 
organizations that are opposed against change for three reasons. First, the political movements of parties are 
constrained with their identified issue positions. Second, their social appeals are constrained with their 
dependence on the support of certain social groups. Third, change threatens the organizational cohesion of 
parties, which are built on delicate power bases (Janda, 1990). As a consequence, they only implement 
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changes when there is a strong environmental pressure, like electoral defeat (Panebianco, 1988; Harmel & 
Janda, 1994). As mentioned in the introduction, other factors may also explain party change. Examples are 
the coalition of the willingness, leadership change and differing party goals (Harmel & Janda, 1994). 
Following the performance theory of party change, “the poorer the party’s performance, the greater the 
pressure for party change” (Janda, 1990, p9). Regarding this overview, we expect that the bigger the electoral 
losses are, the more of these changes parties will implement. Conform the electoral results of the parties 
during the 1990s (table 1), we expect following hypotheses: 
 
H4 
SP and CVP will implement more changes in the period of 1991-1995 compared to the period of 1995-1999. 
PVV/VLD will implement fewer changes than SP and CVP.  
 
Table 1: electoral results 
 
b. Party change as response 
Party change is a change coming directly from a group decision (Harmel & Janda, 1994). To distinguish it 
from any alternation, the change must be in direct control of the party. Examples are changes in party rules, 
structures, policies and tactics. The dominant coalition makes these changes under pressure from others inside 
the party or it may be a new dominant coalition with a new confirmation. They can be distinguished in this 
way from any alternation (Harmel & Janda, 1994). 
Year SP CVP PVV/VLD AGALEV VB 
1987 14,9 19,5 11,6 4,5 1,9 
1991 12 16,8 12 4,9 6,6 
1995 12,6 17,2 13,2 4,4 7,8 
1999 9,6 14,1 14,3 7 9,9 
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Mair, Müller and Plassers (2004) also give five2 possible party change categories as responses which parties 
can give to this electoral change. First, there may be strategic responses towards the voters. They may rethink 
their electoral target groups whereby old target groups are replaced by new ones, can add new party groups 
of voters or they can intensify their ties to their core voter group. The repoliticization of women’s issues in 
the 1970s is one example of this response. Second, there also may be a strategic response towards their 
competing parties. Parties can reconsider which their targeting opponents or their allies are. Third, parties 
may seek for institutional change in the country where they operate. They may manipulate their electoral 
system and change the rules of the game. However, this change is often only possible when there is a multi-
party consensus. One example may be to increase the electoral threshold. Fourth, there may be organizational 
responses where internal power distribution is rearranged (Panebianco, 1988). Examples are new procedures 
of leadership selection and candidate selection. As last option, parties may respond with programmatic, 
ideological and policy oriented responses. They can reposition themselves on issues in their manifestos (Mair 
et al, 2004). These last two responses (programmatic and organizational change) will be discussed in more 
detail. Furthermore, we will look at which of these two responses the different mainstream parties gave to 
their electoral decline.  
 
Programmatic change 
Programmatic change may be seen as a remedy for electoral loss since electoral support and backing of the 
party activists are based on these programmatic stances (Adams et al, 2006; Spoon, 2009 & Aldrich, 1983). 
By changing them, parties are able to respond to changes in electoral markets. Furthermore, mainstream 
parties are more likely to change their political program in line with public opinion shifts (Adams et al, 2006). 
Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries (2014) studied the issue mobilization of green issues in particular. Their findings 
 
2 The authors give also the possibility of a non-response. Parties may choose not to respond to electoral change, this may simply be because they have other 
goals. One possible division is between policy seeking and vote seeking goals (Somer-Topcu, 2009). However, as we work within the performance theory of party change 
(Janda, 1990), we do not examine this response.  
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are that green issues will be more mobilized if there is electoral opportunity for the opponent parties and if 
the ecological parties form an electoral threat for the opponent parties. By this means, there can be expected 
that the winning niche parties of the previous elections have an impact on the program of mainstream parties. 
Therefore, a comparison of the programmatic change of mainstream parties towards the niche parties is 
valuable. A first hypothesis in this regard is that mainstream parties will converge to the winning competitor 
in terms of policy positions at election t+1, when they faced the most electoral loss in election t (van Spanje, 




The policy position of SP and CVP will be more converged with the niche parties’ in 1995 as in 
1999.  
The policy positions of PVV/VLD will show fewer convergence with the niche parties’. 
 
There are two categories of programmatic responses parties can give to changes in electoral markets: change 
in salience and a change in policy position (Mair et al, 2004). Parties may differ in the attention they give to 
an issue, which is the salience approach (Dolezal et al, 2014). They can also move their position on the 
various competition dimensions, which is a change in policy position (Mair et al., 2004). Niche party success 
causes both for a change in salience of the niche party’s issue as the policy position regarding the issue 
(Abou-Chadi, 2014, Meguid, 2005). Abou-Chadi (2014) already examined how the ecological and radical 
right parties differs in their impact. His results are that the success of radical right will cause an increase in 
emphasizes of the multiculturalism issue, while the success of ecological parties will cause a decrease in 
salience of environmental protection. Abou-Chadi (2014) focusses mainly on differences between the impact 
of both niche parties. This paper will focus more on the differences between the mainstream parties’ 
responses. Both policy position as salience will be examined. 
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In terms of policy positions of the party, parties may also follow the demand and supply side in politics. One 
approach may be to work on Downs’ one-dimensional left-right scale on the socio-economic cleavage 
(Downs, 1957). However, regarding the dichotomy of niche- and mainstream parties, other issues need to be 
examined instead of only the classic socio-economic issues. As a consequence, party competition in a 
multidimensional spatial continuum and the particular issues of niche parties will be examined. Looking at 
the supply side, voters will vote at the ideology of the party closest to these issues (Abou-Chadi, 2014). As 
mentioned above, niche party success causes both for a change in salience of the niche party’s issue as the 
policy position towards the issue (Abou-Chadi, 2014). Following Meguid (2005) her Modified Spatial theory, 
mainstream parties may react to the issues presented by niche parties in three ways. They can choose to 
handle an accommodative, an adversial or a dismissive strategy. In the first case, when a party addresses 
a new (or niche) issue, other parties can copy this policy position. This accommodative strategy is an ideal 
type, as mainstream parties may converge more towards a niche party, while not being completely converged. 
With the second strategy, parties will handle an opposite policy position as the new party. Handling a 
dismissive strategy, the established parties will choose to ignore the issue. But mainstream parties also may 
choose to emphasize “hot issues” more (Mair et al, 2004), which is not mentioned by Meguid (2005). Both 
strategies refer to the saliency of an issue. The above mentioned remark on the accommodative strategy as 
an ideal type also accounts for the other three strategies. In this paper, the direction towards the niche party 
will be handled. There will be looked at which of these four strategies mainstream parties applied in their 
response towards niche parties’ success. The adversial and accommodative strategy are handled together, as 
they both refer to the policy position taken. Convergence is in Meguids terminology an accommodative 
strategy. The policy position of mainstream parties will stand closer to these of niche parties regarding the 
niche party’s issue. Divergence, on the other hand, is what Meguid calls an adversial strategy. As mentioned 
above, one of the research questions is: “Which programmatic responses did the Flemish mainstream parties 
implement?” Both a change in policy position and salience of mainstream parties regarding the niche parties’ 
main issues will be examined.  
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However, not every mainstream party will respond in the same way to the electoral success of niche parties. 
Three factors (see figure 3) explain variation in the mainstream parties’ strategy towards niche parties: the 
previous explained electoral decline at the previous election, the ideology of the mainstream party itself and 
the ideology of the niche party (Abou-Chadi, 2014). The two remaining factors of variation will be handled 
together in the next section. 
 
Figure 3 Variation factors in programmatic change, based on Abou-Chadi (2014) 
 
The willingness to change their program depends on the ideology of the mainstream party itself. From a 
political marketing perspective, parties want to stay congruent to their history. They will try to maintain the 
balance between attracting new segments and keeping their traditional core voters (Lilleker & Lees-
Marshment, 2005). For this reason, they will emphasize the issue and converge more to the winning niche 
party a competitor closest to their own ideology and history on the spatial continuum (Abou-Chadi, 2014). 
SP, as a center-left party, will be more influenced by AGALEV, while PVV/VLD, as a moderate-right party 
















Sp will more converge towards AGALEV (ecological party) on ecological issues.  
Sp will emphasize ecological issues more than multiculturalism issues. 
PVV/VLD will converge more towards Vlaams Blok (radical right) on multiculturalism issues.  
PVV/VLD will emphasize multiculturalism issues more than environmental issues. 
 
c. Organizational change 
Parties may respond to changes in electoral markets with an internal change, focusing on the party’s 
organization. Together with the programmatic changes, the organizational changes of the Flemish 
mainstream parties in 1990 will be examined. As Panebianco (1988) noticed, every organization undergoes 
a constant amount of changes. To avoid that any alteration can be considered as a change, it is crucial to 
define organizational change. According to Panebianco (1988), fundamental alterations are central,  
“which change the organization’s authority structure, i.e. its organizational order. (…) It modifies 
relations among the organization’s internal groups, altering the distribution of control over 
incentives and restructuring vertical power games (the elite-follower exchanges), and thus horizontal 
power games (the elite-elite exchanges) as well.” (Panebianco, 1988, p 243).  
 
In this paper, organizational changes are changes in organizational decision-making structures. Adapting new 
rules regarding the organizational decision-making structures can influence power games and provides a 
change in the organization’s authority structure. To see if the mainstream parties’ internal organizational 
decision-making structure changes, there will be looked at the vertical power distribution of the party. It 
indicates the degree of freedom of choice for the leadership of the party. If the vertical integration is high, 
the party leadership will be dominated on issues like centralization of power, new methods of candidate 
selection and new methods of candidate selection (Panebianco, 1988; Schumacher & Giger, 2018). When a 
party has a decentralized policy decision making process, it means that authority is transferred from the party 
leader(s) or the intra-parliamentary group towards extra-parliamentary groups, including members and vice 
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versa (Strom, 1990). Mainstream parties may be responding to the change in electoral markets with new 
methods of candidate selection. They can open their selection process towards a more inclusive or exclusive 
form. Following Rahat and Hazan (2001), there are five possibilities of whom the selectorate consists. The 
most inclusive selectorate is the electorate of the mainstream party, the most exclusive is when one, non-
selected party leader chooses which candidate stands on the candidate list (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Party selectorates, Rahat and Hazan, 2001, p301. 
 
Third, there may be a change in the party leaders selectorate. Cross & Blais (2012) finds that electoral loss 
partly explains this reform. The selection of the party leader can be through the head of the party or through 
elections (Wauters, 2009). The change can be more inclusive or more exclusive. Following Kenig (2009), 
there are six possible party leader selectorates. The most inclusive is the party’s electorate, the most exclusive 
is letting the party leader choose by one individual (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Party leader selectorate. Source: Kenig (2009) 
 
This vertical power distribution in internal decision-making process can be presented on a continuum, with 
one extreme activist-based party and the other extreme leadership-dominated party. In activist-based parties, 
activists will dictate policy formulation, candidate selection and leadership selection and vice versa 
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(Schumacher, de Vries & Vis, 2013). On this continuum, the position of both niche parties differs. The 
nationalist parties (as Vlaams Blok) are seen as highly leadership-dominated, while ecological parties like 
AGALEV are more activist-based. One research question is: “Which organizational responses did the 
Flemish mainstream parties implement?”. This will be examined through a change of position on the activist-
based or leadership-dominated continuum. However, the elections in 1990s are often seen as protest voting 
elections where many votes were given out of protest and dissatisfaction with the existing political system 
(Maddens & Hajnal, 2001). We expect that none of the mainstream parties will move towards a leadership-
dominated model. Instead, mainstream parties will try to bridge the gap between citizen and politics with 
implementing a more inclusive form of decision-making structure. 
 
H2 
All three mainstream parties will converge more towards an activist-based party. 
 
There will be variation to the extent in which mainstream parties will develop towards a more activist-based 
party. As mentioned above, political parties are conservative organizations and consists of delicate power 
bases (Janda, 1990). Parties will try to balance between keeping their organizational cohesion and 
implementing change. Therefore, the original position of the mainstream parties explains the variation 
between them. The three mainstream parties families are located in the center close to each other. In this 
center, social democratic parties are more activist-based because they have stronger formal ties with activist 
groups and they try to include these activist groups in their decision-making processes. Christian democratic 
parties are the most leadership-dominated of the three mainstream parties, followed by the liberals 







SP will converge the most towards an activist-based party. 
CVP will converge the least towards an activist-based party.  
 
In the next section, there will be examined if there is a change in organizational decision-making structure 
and to which direction this change goes. We do this by examining the mainstream parties organizational 
position on the centralization of power, new methods of candidate selection and new methods of leader 
selection.  
 
Data, methods and operationalization 
One research question is which of the two types of responses the Flemish mainstream parties adapted the 
most in the 1990s. To answer this, we first have to map if the mainstream parties implemented these 
responses. We do a document analysis of the party statutory of the Flemish mainstream parties to examine 
organizational change. The programmatic changes are measured through the manifestos of the Flemish 
mainstream parties during the multiple campaigns at the general elections in the 1990s. We use data of the 
Comparative Manifesto project, which is a project that codes party manifestos in 42 countries. The CMP is 
the most complete dataset and measures policy positions and salience of almost every party in all the elections 
after 1945. These policy positions are developed from a content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos 
(CMP, Manifesto Project Database). It is based on the coding of quasi-sentences following 56 issue categories 
(Abou-Chadi, 2014). The data on each issue represents the percentage of the total amount of statements 
compromised by each issue category. In this way, the data is standardized with regard to the manifesto length 
(Kim & Fording, 2003). The dataset is appropriate for this study because it measures both the salience as the 
policy positions. Furthermore, the operationalization of programmatic and organizational change will be 





The policy positions and the salience of the three mainstream parties on the niche parties’ main issue are 
studied in comparison with the policy position of the niche party on its main issue during the three general 
Belgian elections in 1990s. We examine three mainstream parties and two niche parties on two niche issues.  
 
The first niche party is the radical right Vlaams Blok where multiculturalism is their main issue. As 
mentioned above, CMP-data measures both the salience as the positions of parties on a issue. Both are 
measured in a different way. On an issue, parties can emphasize a positive or negative stance. These different 
stances on the issue are seen as paired nature. Issue salience is the sum of both (Abou-Chadi, 2014). For the 




I use the same measuring method as Kim and Fording (2003), which also used the paired nature of the 
manifesto data. However, in order to develop a measure of policy positions that is independent of salience, 
the share of a positive category must be subtracted from the share of a negative category. To obtain net policy 
position, this difference must be divided with the total percentage of statements regarding this issue (the 
salience). A parties’ policy position will range from -1 to 1, where a larger score indicates larger support of 




The second examined niche party is the Flemish ecological party, AGALEV. Their main issue is 
environmental protection (per501). To measure the salience and policy positions we need both a “positive” 
and a “negative” category. However, “environmental protection” does not have a natural pair. I will follow 
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the operationalization of Abou-Chadi (2014) and use ‘productivity’ (per410) as the negative stance. 
Productivity is used as an opposite of environmental protection, as proponents of industrial productivity and 
economic growth ‘can be regarded as opposed to a focus on a pollution-free environment and more 
sustainable growth’ (Abou-Chadi,2014, p425). Policy positions and salience on the theme of environmental 
protection are measured through the following formula:  
 
 Environmental protection (salience): per501+per410 
 
 Environmental protection (position): (per501-per410)/(per501+per410). 
 
The policy positions and salience of the three mainstream parties will be compared to each other on the niche 
parties’ main issues. However, the CMP data shows some shortcomings on niche party issue coding and was 
earlier criticized by some scholars (Krouwel, 1999; Budge & Klingemann, 2001). It is often seen as counter 
intuitive and against political reality. Extremist parties can be presented more moderately than they actually 
are (Krouwel, 1999; Budge & Klingemann, 2001). According to Budge and Klingemann (2001), the cause 
of this deviation is that extreme parties presents themselves more moderately in their manifestos as they hope 
to reach a broader electorate. The data of AGALEV and Vlaams Blok also showed this shortcoming. As a 
consequence, the policy positions of both parties are not included in the analysis. The policy positions of 
mainstream parties will be examined each election year (1991, 1995, 1999). 1987 will be studied in the 
following graphics as a referring point where no change occured.  
 
Organizational change 
As mentioned above, organizational change will be examined through a document analysis of the party 
statutory rules. Changes towards an activist-based or leadership-dominated party will be examined based on 
three categories: centralization, candidate selection and leadership selection. 
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A party that implement decentralized changes will move closer towards the activist-based party model. When 
a party has a decentralized policy decision making process, it means that authority is transferred from the 
party leader(s) or the intra-parliamentary group towards extra-parliamentary groups, including members, and 
vice versa (Strom, 1990, pp 577-579). (De)centralization is measured through the proportion of these two 
inside the parties key decision-making organ, mostly called ‘partijbureau’3.  
 
 Centralization of power=  
((party leader(s) and MP’s) – (extra-parliamentary individuals)) /  
((party leader(s) and MP’s) + (extra-parliamentary individuals)). 
 
To operationalize new methods of candidate selection, I follow the continuum of Rahat and Hazan (2001) 
(figure 4). Parties who are more activist-based will have a more inclusive method of candidate selection and 
vice versa. New methods of leader selection will also be examined by looking at changes in the selectorate. 
The most inclusive and closest to the activist-based model is letting the electorate choose for the party leader. 
The most exclusive form and closest to the leadership-dominated model is when a single individual appoints 
the party leader (Kenig, 2009) (figure 5). 
 
We examine four elections, starting with the general election of 1987. This point is seen as “point zero”, as 
comparing point. In order to examine changes, we first have to know what a “neutral” situation is. 
Furthermore, we must pay attention that every election year mentioned in tables and graphics refers to the 








Our model started with the assumption that mainstream parties react to electoral losses with party change. 
Together, the mainstream parties implemented 39 programmatic and organizational responses in the 1990s 
(figure 6). CVP had the most changes in 1995 while SP and PVV/VLD had the most changes in 1999. Overall, 
the party that implemented the most changes was PVV/VLD. In figure 6 the multiple reactions of the 
mainstream parties are listed for each selection. “0” means no change has occurred compared to the previous 
election. For policy position, + means convergence, ++ means strong convergence, - divergence and - - strong 
divergence. Regarding issue salience, (+)+ means (strong) increase and vice versa. Regarding the 
organizational change, + (+) means moving towards an activist-based party (more inclusive) and (-)- towards 
a leadership-dominated party. + means more decentralization and more inclusive candidate/leadership 
selections and vice versa. Figure 6 shows that mainstream parties reacted differently on their electoral losses. 
In following sections this variety between mainstream parties will be explained more in detail. 
 
 
Figure 6 Schematic overview mainstream parties’ responses 
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Regarding specific programmatic change, all mainstream parties implemented each election a programmatic 
response. There is variation between the mainstream parties in these responses. All mainstream parties 
reacted each election on the ecological party’s success. In figure 7, the more the position is towards -1, the 
more environmental protective the mainstream parties position is on ecological issues. When a mainstream 
parties’ position is close to 1, this mainstream party is more in favor of economic production and growth. 
Confirming my hypothesis, SP converged the most with AGALEV. In 1995, there was also complete 
convergence with VLD and AGALEV, but in 1999 VLD diverged more towards the center. CVP diverged 
from AGALEV in 1991 and 1995, but converged hefty in 1999. This also is found in salience (figure 8). The 
salience of environmental issues decreases every election, but in 1999, CVP and SP had an increase. SP 
always emphasized ecological issues the most of all mainstream parties. In figure 9, the policy positions of 
the mainstream parties is showed. When the mainstream parties’ policy position is 1, the party is completely 
converged with Vlaams Blok and is negative towards multiculturalism. PVV/VLD converged two elections 
completely with Vlaams Blok. It also emphasized this issue the most (except in 1991). CVP seems less 
reactive towards the success of Vlaams Blok. In 1991, SP had a remarkable divergence to the opposite stance 
of multiculturalism, while in 1999, it converged towards the center. With exception of 1991, PVV/VLD 
emphasized the issue the most of all mainstream parties (figure 10).
  


























Figure 9 Policy position multiculturalism    Figure 10 Salience Multiculturalism 
  
Regarding organizational responses, the convergence towards an activist-based party was examined. 
Centralization, candidates selectorate and leadership selectorate were studied. In figure 12, when a 
mainstream party is closer to one it is more centralized governed. As for the traditional parties, CVP and 
PVV/VLD are slowly going to more a more centralized party (figure 12). However, they remain close to 
the “break-even” point where authority is equally spread. SP on the other hand is the most central 
governed. Only by the elections of 1999 they know a more decentralizing trend, but they still remain the 
most centralized party of all. Overall, we see no fundamental changes in the mainstream parties’ 
centralization authority structure. Furthermore, none of the mainstream parties formally changed their 
rules of composition of “partijbureau”. As our definition of change is that it comes directly from a group 
decision, we do not see these increases as a change but as an alternation. As a consequence, none of the 



























Figure 12 Centralization of power 
 
Regarding the selectorate of candidate selection (see appendix 1) and leadership selection (see appendix 2) 
there is a trend in all mainstream parties towards a more inclusive form. Nevertheless there was variation in 
time and in the degree of inclusiveness. The candidate selectorate of SP consisted during the 1990s of a 
selected party agency. It did not respond on the environmental pressures with a more inclusive candidate 
selection selectorate. PVV/VLD and CVP on the other hand implemented more inclusive initiatives on 
candidate selection. PVV/VLD had the most far-reaching reforms. In their changed statutes of 1993, 
registered voters and party members could through pre-election compile a candidate list. These registered 
voters are not party members but they do have to sign the declaration of principles and can not be a member 
of another political party (VLD, 1993). When VLD changed their statutes in 1997, they removed the option 
of registered voters as there was too little interest (Wauters, 2005). Since 1994, CVP gives their party 
members the right to vote for the candidate lists composition in a poll (CVP, 1994). SP was the last party to 
change their party leader selectorate towards a more inclusive form. At the time of the general election in 
1999, all party members could vote for the party president. Regarding CVP and PVV/VLD, the evolution of 
party leader selectorate change shows quiet the similar trends as the evolution of change in candidate 
selectorate. All members of CVP could vote for the party president at the time of the elections of 1995. As 












1987 1991 1995 1999
SP CVP PVV VLD
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the party president in 1995. They were labeled as registered voters. However, this reform was also set back 
at the general elections of 1999.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In general, the Flemish mainstream parties adapted more programmatic changes than organizational changes 
in the 1990s. Out of the 39 responses, 32 were programmatic. This may be due to the structural and more 
fixed character of organizational structure changes. Statutory rules are not often revised, while choices 
regarding programmatic positions and salience have to be taken each election period. Second, mainstream 
parties in Flanders are more vulnerable to ecological party’s success. Both on programmatic and 
organizational change, mainstream parties shifted more towards the position of ecological parties. A possible 
explanation could be that the winning elections of Vlaams Blok are often interpreted as protest voting 
elections whereby citizens presents a warning. Mainstream parties responded to this warning by adopting a 
more inclusive organization. Against my expectations, it was not SP but PVV/VLD that implemented most 
changes in 1990s, despite their electoral gains. One explanation may be that PVV/VLD already emphasized 
bridging the gap between politics and citizens. They were in favor of party change (Verhofstadt, 1992). 
Furthermore, they might have had other unfulfilled party goals that caused changes, like an office seeking 
goal (Harmel & Janda, 1994). During the 1990s, PVV/VLD was the whole time an opposition party. CVP 
did implement the most changes after the election they had lost the most votes (1991), which confirms my 
hypothesis. This is not the case for SP. This party also faced its biggest electoral loss in 1991, but 
implemented less changes in 1995 as it did in 1999. However, it does not completely disconfirm my 
hypothesis since the party was already discussing their statutory rules before the elections, but ratified them 
after the elections of 1995. They were already discussing change. Furthermore, it was remarkably that CVP’s 
policy position converged hefty towards the position of AGALEV in 1999. This may be due to the period of 
the dioxin crisis. CVP and SP also had an increase of salience of the ecological issue in 1999, while they 
emphasized the issue less each election before. Regarding the convergence towards the niche parties, 
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mainstream parties seems to be more influenceable by the success of the niche party closest to them on the 
spatial continuum. It confirms my hypothesis that moderate right parties will be more reactive to the success 
of radical right and center-left parties will be more reactive to the success of ecological parties. 
 
This study argues that mainstream parties responded on their strong electoral losses with organizational and 
programmatic reforms. These two categories of party change are examined during the Belgian general 
elections of the 1990s. All three Flemish mainstream parties (SP, CVP and PVV/VLD) implemented both 
programmatic as organizational reforms. However, programmatic responses were implemented more as 
organizational ones. Furthermore, there is variation in the responses of mainstream parties. SP converged 
more to the policy position of AGALEV, while PVV/VLD converged more to the policy position of Vlaams 
Blok. PVV/VLD implemented most organizational changes, while SP implemented the least. All three 
mainstream parties converged towards a more activist-based party model. These findings on the party change 
of mainstream parties have important implications for the analysis of multiparty competition and the party 
change literature. First, there was little earlier research on mainstream party organizational change after 
electoral loss. Second, there never was an integrated study of these two categories of responses in a 
dichotomic model of party competition before. However, further research will be needed to examine these 
two categories more in detail. Furthermore, strategic stances will need to be examined as a third category of 
mainstream party response. My results also showed that electoral loss is not a sufficient condition for 
mainstream parties to implement organizational and programmatic change. Further research may take into 
account other explanations regarding mainstream party responses, such as the impact of coalition of the 
willingness, leadership change and differing party goals. The scope of this research should be widened as 
well. By including more decades and more countries, further studies would be able to examine the impact of 
success of niche parties’ on mainstream party’s change in more detail. Other research will be needed to 
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1. New methods of candidate selection.  
Table 3 Candidate selection 
Election Year Party Selectorate 
1987 SP Selected party agency 
(Arrondissement federations) 
 CVP Selected party agency 
(Arrondissement federations) 
 PVV Selected party agency 
(Arrondissement federations) 
1991 SP - 




1995 SP Selected party agency 
(Arrondissement federations + party 
office) 
 CVP Party members 
 VLD Electorate – party members  
1999 SP - 
 CVP - 
 VLD Party members 




2. New methods of leader selection 




1987 SP Congress, consisting of: 1 delegate per 300 members Assigned by 
arrondissemental federations 
 CVP Congress, consisting of: 1 delegate per 50 members Assigned by local sections 
 PVV Congress, consisting of: 1 delegate per 1250 votes at the parliamentary elections 
and 1 delegate per 150 members Assigned by arrondissemental federations  
1991 SP - 




1995 SP Congress, consisting of: 1 delegate per 200 members Assigned by federations 
 CVP Congress, consisting of all members 
 VLD Congress, consisting of all members and registered voters 
1999 SP Congress, consisting of all members 
 CVP - 
 VLD - 
 
 
